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MISTRIALS IN COURTS-MARTIAL:
A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL
CHARACTER OF THE MILITARY JUDGE
PAUL E. WILSON*
INTRODUCTION
The judicially declared mistrial is a relatively new concept in
the administration of military justice. The word "mistrial" does not
appear in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, nor is it used in the
current Manual for Courts-Martial. A little more than a decade ago the
law officer's power to terminate a trial prior to findings, in the manner
of the civilian judge, was consistently denied by service boards of review.
When the power was finally recognized and confirmed by the Court
of Military Appeals, the opinion of the court reflected the views of
only two of its three members.' The development of the mistrial con-
cept in court-martial procedure is an incident of the transition to a
judicially administered system of military justice, and is illustrative of
the emerging judicial stature of the law officer. The recognition of his
power to terminate the trial of a matter referred by the commander,
when the interests of justice so require, represents a significant stage in
the development of an independent military judiciary.
NATURE OF THE REMEDY
A mistrial is a trial that is legally of no effect because of basic defects
in the proceedings. It is the legal equivalent of no trial at all, and will
be ordered only as a last resort when it is physically impossible to
continue the trial or the record is infected with error so gross as to
raise doubts as to the possibility of a just result if the trial continues.
For the purpose of this inquiry, "mistrial" refers only to trials which are
terminated by competent authority after evidence has been received
on the issue of guilt of the accused and before findings have been re-
turned by the court. It does not include those cases where the charges
have been withdrawn or dismissed prior to trial nor does it include
cases where the findings are set aside on review and a new trial is
* Professor of Law, The University of Kansas. A.B. 1937, A.M. 1938, The University
of Kansas; LL.B. 1940, Washburn University.
1. United States v. Stringer, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 122, 17 C.M.R. 122 (1954).
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ordered. A declaration of mistrial, therefore, is an order of the trial
judge which terminates a trial in progress and discharges the jury or
other trier of fact prior to the determination of the controverted issue.
The order declaring a mistrial is an interlocutory order.2 It does not
end the proceedings against the accused. Hence it is not reviewable until
the case is completed. The request or consent of the accused is not neces-
sary to a valid declaration of mistrial. On the contrary, when a free
and fair hearing cannot be had, a mistrial should be declared even in the
face of the accused's objection. 3 From a pragmatic point of view, one
of the most significant incidents of the mistrial is that even though the
trial may have progressed beyond the point where the accused would
otherwise have been placed in jeopardy, the lawful declaration of mis-
trial does not bar a subsequent trial for the same offense.
The declaration of mistrial is an exercise of judicial power, one that
belongs exclusively to the trial judge in civilian courts. While at com-
mon law the trial court could not discharge a jury after it had been
sworn in a criminal case, the power now exists in civil and criminal
cases alike.4 The objective is sometimes accomplished by the fiction of
the "withdrawal of a juror." But regardless of the technique or
terminology employed, it is now universally recognized that an in-
cident of the trial judge's duty to assure a fair trial is the power to
use his discretion to terminate a proceeding in which fairness has become
impossible.
MILITARY ANTECEDENTS OF THE MISTRIAL
Although the idea of the mistrial in military law is not unlike its
counterpart in the civilian courts, its antecedents are quite different.
Prior to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, no element of the court-
martial had power to terminate a trial. The absence of this essential
judicial power is not surprising when it is remembered that the tribunals
administering military justice are not part of the judicial branch of the
government, but instead are instrumentalities of the executive power.
They have been conceived to possess no inherent powers, judicial or
otherwise, but are competent to do only those things authorized by
express statute or derived from military usage. The court-martial has
been described as:
2. Quinn, C.J., in 17 C.M.R. at 138.
3. 17 C.M.R. at 132.
4. 53 Am. JUR. Triais § 970 (1954).
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* . a creature of orders, and except in so far as an independent
discretion may be given by statute, it is as much subject to the
orders of a competent superior as is any military body or person.5
So far as the court and the parties were concerned, the referral of
charges for trial were orders of the commander, addressed to military
subordinates, and, like other military orders, required obedience on the
part of subordinates. A decision of the court-martial to terminate a
trial before findings might have subjected the members of the court to
penalties for insubordination. 6
Patently, situations would arise wherein considerations of justice or
policy, or both, might require the termination of a trial before its con-
clusion. In such cases the power to withdraw the charge belonged
solely to the convening authority. He alone, as the representative of the
United States, was authorized to withdraw charges before trial or to
direct a nolle prosequi or other termination to be entered as to a charge
of specification -after the charges were placed before the court and after
arraignment. The pre-existing practice may have suggested the provi-
sion of Paragraph 55 of the current Manual for Courts-MartiaP which
authorizes the court-martial to suspend proceedings, pending applica-
tion to the convening authority for directions, when the evidence does
not support the specification but indicates a lesser offense.,
Also relevant to our present concern is that portion of Paragraph 56
of the Manual which provides:
5. 1 & 2 Winthrop, Military Law and Procedents 49 (2nd ed. Reprint 1920).
6. Id. at 155. Winthrop suggests that it would constitute a military offense for the
court to amend the charge without authorization. Presumably an unauthorized termina-
tion of the trial before findings night be of the same nature.
7. The references herein are to the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, United States, 1951
[hereinafter cited as M.C.M. 19511. The M~ANUAL is currently being revised. It is ex-
pected that pars. 55 and 56 will be redrafted to reflect the trends disclosed by the cases
examined hereafter.
8. M.C.M. 1951, para. 55.
If at any time during the trial it becomes manifest to the court that the
available evidence as to any specification is not legally sufficient to sustain a
finding of guilty thereof or of any lesser included offense thereunder, but
that there is substantial evidence, either before the court or offered, tending
to prove that the accused is guilty of some other offense not alleged in any
specification before the court, the court may, in its discretion, either suspend
trial pending action on an application by the trial counsel to the convening
authority for direction in the matter or it may proceed with the trial. In
the latter event, a report of the matter may properly be made to the con-
vening authority at the conclusion of the trial.
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The convening authority may direct the prosecution to make
a declaration of record that a certain specification, and when ap-
propriate, the charge under which it is laid is withdrawn and will
not be pursued further at the trial. A specification will be with-
drawn only when directed by the convening authority who may
give such direction either on his own initiative or on appli-
cation duly made to him. The convening authority may not with-
draw a specification if the court has finally terminated the pro-
ceedings by a finding or by a ruling which amounts to a finding
of not guilty.9
It is probably a semantic error to speak of the convening authority's
power to withdraw specifications or otherwise to terminate a trial prior
to findings as the power to declare a mistrial. It is rather one of the in-
cidents of military command that has no counterpart in the administra-
tion of justice in civilian courts. When he causes a trial to be terminated,
the convening authority assumes to act as the guardian of justice in his
court-martial jurisdiction. Whether such a rule is consistent with the
objectives of the code is a matter of doubt and will be commented upon
later. However, a consideration of the law officer's judicial power to
adjudge mistrials must recognize the apparently parallel power of the
convening authority expressly conferred in the code and noted by the
Manual. Indeed, most of the cases dealing with mistrials analogizes the
law officer's power in this respect to that of the convening authority and
the limitations in the manual and code which expressly restrict his power
are also made applicable to the law officer.
THE POWER TO DECLARE MIsTRIALs-THE EMERGING JUDICIAL
STATURE OF THE LAW OFFICER
The creation of the law officer and the definition of his role in the
general court-martial was an innovation in military law. Like all in-
novators, the framers of the code and their advisors were apparently
unsure of the nature of the role that they had created. It is clear that it
was the intention of the code to invest the law officer with powers
similar to those of the civilian judge. At the same time, a strong military
tradition and peculiar military needs and objectives required that dis-
tinctions be observed. Illustrative are the provisions of the code relating
to rulings by the law officer. 10 He may be overruled by members of the
9. M.C.M. 1951, para. 56.
10. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, art. 51(b) [hereinafter cited as U.C.M.J.I.
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court-martial with respect to a holding on a motion for findings of not
guilty, or the question of the accused's sanity. He has no power to
sentence the convicted accused."
The power to declare mistrials is not expressly conferred by the code,
nor is there evidence that such power was contemplated by the authors
of the Manual for Courts-Martial. It is true that with certain exceptions,
the law officer is authorized to rule on interlocutory questions generally. 12
A passing comment on the law officer's power to declare a mistrial is
found in at least one place in the congressional hearings on the code
prior to its enactment.'" A contemporaneous study by members of the
Judge Advocate General's Corps points out that among the circumstances
in which jeopardy will not attach even though evidence has been re-
ceived, is the instance where "a mistrial is declared because of matters
prejudicial to the accused or the government." 14 But in each case, the
reference is so casual that we cannot feel secure in the conclusion that
the intent of the code was to confer upon the law officer the judicial
power to declare mistrials.
These propositions are clear. First, no component of the court-martial
had the power to declare a mistrial prior to the code. 15 Second, subse-
quent to the enactment of the code, service boards of review of all the
armed services held expressly that a court-martial and its component
elements lacked the power to declare a mistrial and that the motion for
mistrial was then unknown to military law.' A statement in United
States v. Conway"7 sums up the view usually expressed. There among
other grounds for reversal, it was urged that the law officer committed
prejudicial error by declaring in open court that there was no pro-
vision for the law officer of a court-martial to declare a mistrial. The
board comments:
We find no error here for we agree with the statement ....
Other provisions of the court-martial procedure as prescribed in
11. U.C.MJ., art. 52.
12. U.C.MJ., art. 51 (b).
13. Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before the House Conmm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess., at 1154.
14. JAG, LAL AND LEGIsLATivE BASIS; MANUrAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES
(1951).
15. Supra notes 5 and 6.
16. United States v. Conway, N.C.M. 228, 11 C.M.R. 625 (1952); United States v.
Beale, C.G.C.M.S. 19655, 7 C.M.R. 469 (1952); United States v. Simpson, A.C.M. 3430,
4 C.M.R. (AF) 256 (1950); United States v. Stevenson, 45 B.R. 267, 284.
17. N.C.M. 228, 11 C.M.R. 625 (1952).
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the code and manual are intended to ensure 'essential fairness' in
the conduct of the trial. Collectively these amount to 'military
due process'. . . .18
In 1954, the problem of power to adjudge a mistrial was first con-
sidered by the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Stringer.9
Narrowly speaking, the case did not involve an order of mistrial. An
earlier trial had been terminated by the convening authority because of
improper remarks by the president of the court-martial. When called
for subsequent trial, the accused raised the defense of double jeopardy.
Two principal questions were considered. First, the court held by the
unanimous opinion of its members that a trial by court-martial may be
terminated prior to findings by reason of "manifest necessity" without
the attachment of jeopardy.20 Second, the court considered without
consensus the question of the proper agency to exercise the power.
Chief Judge Quinn took the view that the power belonged to the law
officer alone. Judge Brosman was inclined to the position that the power
to terminate trials prior to findings was an exclusive power of the con-
vening authority. Judge Latimer felt that the power belonged concur-
rently to both officers. Hence, although generally three different views
were expressed, the power to terminate trials prior to findings was con-
firmed in both the law officer and the convening authority by a two to
one vote.
The law officer's authority to adjudge mistrials has not been seriously
questioned since Stringer. During the past decade it has been so often
confirmed that the question is no longer raised. The recognition of this
aspect of the law officer's role is clearly consistent with the declared
intention of Congress to constitute the law officer as a judge to all in-
tents and purposes. 21 The law officer is not a mere figurehead in the
courtroom drama. He must direct the trial along paths of recognized
procedure in a manner reasonably calculated to bring an end to the
hearing without prejudice to either party.22 His position as a judicial
arbiter was most recently affirmed in United States v. Waldron23 which
recognized the law officer's power to declare a mistrial when the triers
18. 11 C.M.R. at 631.
19. 5 U.S.C.M.A. 122, 17 C.M.R. 122 (1954).
20. 17 C.M.R. at 129. See discussion of "manifest necessity" infra at page 337 et seq.
21. United States v. Berry, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 235, 2 C.M.R. 141 (1952).
22. United States v. Jackson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 14 C.M.R. 64 (1954).
23. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 628, 36 C.M.R. 126 (1966).
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of fact disclosed evidence of pre-judgment of an important witness, thus
casting substantial doubt upon the fairness or impartiality of the trial.
The power of the civilian counterpart of the law officer, the federal
trial judge, to terminate a trial in the interests of justice was established
many years ago in United States v. Perez24 when the Supreme Court
said:
We think that in all cases of this nature the law has invested the
courts of justice with authority to discharge a jury from giving
any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circum-
stances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act,
or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They
are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impos-
sible to define all the circumstances which would render it proper
to interfere. 25
To deny the law officer the power to terminate a proceeding in which
the probability of justice has been impaired, is to deny him an essential
attribute of the judicial office.
CONVENING AUTHORITY'S ROLE
The convening authority's power to terminate a trial prior to findings
was apparently conceded in two sections of the manual: (1) Paragraph
55 authorizes a court which believes that the prosecution's evidence is
insufficient to prove the crime alleged, but may show some other offense,
to suspend trial pending an application by the trial counsel to the con-
vening authority for direction. The necessary implication is that the
convening authority may direct the trial to continue, or may terminate
the present proceeding and cause new charges to be referred. 26 (2) Para-
graph 56 authorizes the convening authority upon his own initiative
or upon application to withdraw any pending specification and the
charge under which it is laid, and to direct that it not be pursued further
at the trial. Grounds for such withdrawal are enumerated in the manual.
Certain safeguards are articulated and provide specifically that after
evidence of guilt or innocence has been heard, the power will be exer-
cised only with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances for
very plain and obvious causes; in no case will a specification be with-
24. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
25. Id. at 580.
26. M.C.M. 1951, para. 55(a).
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drawn unfairly or arbitrarily to the accused; and when the withdrawal
is after evidence has been taken, the reasons must be stated in the record.
A withdrawal of specification under paragraph 56 precludes a subse-
quent trial only when occasioned by the insufficient evidence and with-
out the fault of the accused.27
The reported cases qualify paragraphs 55 and 56. In United States
v. Turkali28 the presentation of evidence had been concluded and the
court-martial had deliberated ten hours when the president reopened
the court and requested that additional witnesses be called by the prose-
cution. On being informed that the witnesses were not available the
court suspended proceedings and sought directions from the convening
authority under paragraph 55. Eight days later the convening authority
directed that the trial continue and the accused moved for his discharge
on the ground that the suspension under paragraph 55 was tantamount
to acquittal. Although the question was not necessarily before the Court
of Military Appeals, a majority gratuitously pointed out that the con-
vening authority might have withdrawn the charge from the court-mar-
tial, even though all the evidence was in, and have caused the accused to
be tried for another crime. In an opinion concurring in the result, Chief
Judge Quinn offers several reasons why the procedure should be con-
demned, the most persuasive of which is that the procedure is funda-
mentally unfair in that it allows the court to supply the government with
advisory findings as to the sufficiency of the evidence before a determina-
tive result is reached.
The posture of the law remained as stated in Turkali until 1961 when
the question was again considered in United States v. Johnpier.29 In
another gratuitous opinion, a majority of the court repudiated the posi-
tion taken in Turkali. In Johnpier the law officer had apparently de-
termined that in view of the evidence the charges had been improperly
drawn. Therefore, he granted the prosecution's motion to refer the
case back to the convening authority. The convening authority directed
that the trial proceed under the charge as originally drawn. Thereupon
the law officer declared a mistrial, believing that the court-martial might
be influenced by the disclosure that the convening authority's views
were contrary to those of the law officer. The accused moved to dis-
miss the subsequent prosecution on the ground that he had been pre-
viously in jeopardy for the same offense. The Court of Military Appeals
27. M.C.M. 1951, para. 56 (a) (b) (c).
28. 6 U.S.C.M.A. 340,20 C.M.R. 56 (1955).
29. 12 U.S.C.M.A. 90,30 C.M.R. 90 (1961).
MISTRIALS IN COURTS-MARTIAL
took note of other grounds justifying the order of mistrial, and then un-
necessarily but expressly overruled Turkali with this comment:
... we are convinced that the paragraph 55 procedure for
suspension of trial in order to obtain the views of the convening
authority is both archaic and unjudicious. It is contrary to the
express language of Article 51 and violates the spirit of the Uniform
Code and the purpose for which it was enacted.30
Thus, the effect of Jobnpier is to diminish materially the status of the
convening authority with respect to the trial. Paragraph 55 had its coun-
terpart in paragraph 70b, Manual for Courts-Martial, 1.949; this in turn
was taken from paragraph 73, Manual for Courts-Martial, 1928. All
empowered the court to continue a case to refer defective specifications
to the convening authority for directions as to further proceedings. The
disapproval of this aspect of the convening authority's power is a sig-
nificant step toward judicial control of the administration of military
justice.
The holding in Johnpier apparently does not affect the power of the
convening authority to withdraw specifications and charges under para-
graph 56. When manifest necessity in the interests of justice or urgent
military necessity requires, the convening authority may withdraw a
specification and the charge under which it is alleged during the progress
of the trial. A serious question arises when we seek justification for the
power.
The convening authority performs a multi-role in the administration
of military justice. As the representative of the government he con-
venes the court-martial and refers charges for trial. Subsequent to the
trial, he performs judicial services as a reviewing agency. Consistent
with these roles there is no legitimate objection to be made to the action
of the convening authority who causes the withdrawal of specifications
prior to trial or who, upon review subsequent to trial, disapproves find-
ings for legal error. The problem arises when the convening authority
is permitted to inject himself into a trial and decide whether the pro-
ceeding should continue or be terminated or suspended in order that
other more effective action may be taken. Under most circumstances,
such a prerogative is not a necessary incident of either his role as repre-
sentative of the government or an appellate authority, and it is wholly
inconsistent with the idea of a trial under the direction and control of
30. 30 C.M.R. at 94.
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an independent judicial officer. Conceding the possibility that in the
extraordinary case the national interest might require termination by the
convening authority, the provisions of the manual seem too broad, and
if implemented literally would seriously burden the orderly administra-
tion of military justice. Hence, the diminution of this aspect of the con-
vening authority's role is wholly justifiable.
THE PROBLEM OF JEOPARDY
The Uniform Code of Military Justice, consistent with other systems
of Anglo-American jurisprudence, protects the accused person from
being twice tried for the same offense without his consent.31 Thus, the
subsequent trial of one whose conviction or acquittal on a charge of
specification has become final after review, is barred. A closer question
arises in the case of the inconclusive termination of the criminal trial.
When is the accused whose trial has ended without findings, but who
has been arraigned and against whom evidence has been offered, liable
to further prosecution? This is the overriding question in every case
where a mistrial has been ordered.
Article 44(c) of the Code defines "trial" to include a proceeding that
is terminated, after evidence has been introduced but prior to findings,
without fault on the part of the accused. While the Article speaks of
terminations by the convening authority or on motion of the prosecu-
tion, the limitation must also be applied to terminations by the law
officer. The Congress intended that the accused should not be har-
assed with subsequent prosecutions when inadequate preparation or ap-
praisal of the evidence in an earlier case has made failure inevitable.3 2
But in both civilian and military courts there are well-recognized situa-
tions in which a termination of a trial after evidence has been offered
and before findings will not prejudice the power of the government to
proceed with a subsequent prosecution. The objective of this section
is to identify those situations.
At the outset it should be noted that in most cases the defense of former
jeopardy is not available to the accused who has sought termination of
the earlier trial. Hence, if the accused has made the motion for mistrial
and it is incorrectly granted, he is estopped from pleading former
jeopardy at a subsequent trial for the same offense. 33 At the same time,
31. U.C.M.J., art. 44.
32. United States v. Stringer, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 122, 17 C.M.R. 122 (1954).
33. Cf. Concurring opinion of Quinn, C.J., in United States v. Ivory, 9 U.S.C.M.A.
516, 26 C.M.R. 296 (1958).
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if the accused, through no fault of his own, is hopelessly prejudiced by
error generated by the government to save a weak case, his asking a
mistrial to avoid conviction should not deprive him of the opportunity
to claim former jeopardy at a subsequent trial 4
The Manuals list of several grounds for withdrawal of specifications
is probably not exhaustive nor are the items mutually exclusive.-5 They
include a substantial defect in the specification; insufficiency of available
evidence to prove the specification; the fact that it is proposed to use an
accused as a witness; manifest necessity in the interest of justice; inter-
ruptions caused by urgent and unforeseen military necessity, with
no possibility of resumption within a reasonable time; and the in-
troduction of inadmissible evidence so highly prejudicial to the gov-
ernment or the accused that the court is likely to be influenced thereby.
Except for the failure of evidence without fault of the accused, as set
out in Section 44 (c) of the Code, it was the apparent intent that the
termination of the proceedings for any of the reasons mentioned would
not preclude a subsequent trial.36
In Stringer the Court of Military Appeals concluded that Congress
had left the framers of the Manual free to adopt appropriate rules gov-
erning former jeopardy in courts-martial, and that the Manual's drafts-
men had intended to adopt the federal rule relating to the circumstances
under which jeopardy attaches following the presentation of evidence.3 7
That rule, the foundation for which is United States v. Perez,38 permits
the termination of a trial, without jeopardy, when there is a manifest
necessity or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. The
doctrine of manifest necessity had been applied in a military situation
in Wade v. Hunter,39 a case decided during the time that the Uniform
Code of Military Justice was pending before the Congress. The trial
of an accused charged with rape had been interrupted by a military troop
movement during combat. Accordingly, the charges were withdrawn
from the court-martial to which they were first referred and assigned
to a command physically in a more favorable position to try the case.
A plea of double jeopardy was interposed by the accused in the second
court-martial convened to try the case. The plea was overruled by the
34. Gori v. United States, 364 U.S. 917 (1961).
35. M.C.M. 1951, para. 56B.
36. Supra note 14.
37. 17 C.M.R. at 128.
38. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
39. 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
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court whose action was finally sustained by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Relying extensively on the Perez case, the Court stated:
. . . a defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to the
public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.40
Thus Perez and Wade and Stringer and the provisions of the Manual
established beyond doubt that "manifest necessity" requires the termina-
tion of a trial by court-martial and precludes the subsequent defense of
former jeopardy, even though evidence has been received on the issue
of guilt. The most serious issue litigated since 1954 has been concerned
with the meaning of "manifest necessity" and the measure of discretion
to be accorded the law officer in making his determination.
GROUNDS FOR MISTRIAL-THE MEANING OF MANIFEST NECESSITY
The law officer may declare a mistrial upon the motion of either the
prosecution or the defense, or he may do so sua sponte. However, it is
a drastic remedy and the cases are consistent in their position that it
should be used only as a last resort.41 In most instances other remedies
are available to cure or avoid prejudicial error. The objectionable
evidence may be stricken; 42 cautionary or limiting instructions may
serve as a palliative;43 or in a proper case the law officer may excuse an
objectionable member from the court.44 The initial and usually the
final determination of the particular relief to be granted lies in the
discretion of the law officer. As the law officer is present in the
court room he has the best opportunity to observe the impact of
error on the court and to determine the appropriate corrective action.
Ordinarily the appellate court will not invade the province of a law
officer's discretion. Only when there is a clear abuse of discretion on
his part, will the law officer's ruling be disturbed on review.45
It is basic that the law officer's declaration is presumed to be valid. It
is equally basic that the burden of proving an abuse of discretion rests
upon the party who alleges it.
40. Id. at 689.
41. Cf. United States v. Keleher, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 125, 33 C.M.R. 337 (1963).
42. United States v. Shamlian, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 28, 25 C.M.R. 290 (1958).
43. United States v. Keleher, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 125, 33 C.M.R. 337 (1963).
44. United States v. Batchelor, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 354, 22 C.M.R. 144 (1956).
45. United States v. Shamlian, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 28, 25 C.M.R. 290 (1958); United States
v. Patrick, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 212, 24 C.M.R. 22 (1957).
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Standards for the exercise of a discretionary power are difficult to
-articulate. The general situation that requires a mistrial has been re-
iterated by the court time and time again. Typical language is found in
United States v. Richard,46 where the court said:
This device is designed to cure errors which are manifestly
prejudicial, and the effect of which cannot be obliterated by
cautionary instructions or the ends of public justice would other-
wise be defeated.47
United States v. Stringer8 goes a step further:
... a trial must be kept free from substantial doubt as to
legality, fairness and impartiality. To some extent this goal en-
visages more than the mere rendition of correct decisions in
particular cases. A judicial system operates effectively only with
public confidence-and, naturally, that trust exists only if there
also exists a belief that triers of fact act fairly.49
The inference is that the declaration of mistrial should be used to avoid
not only unfairness but such appearance of unfairness which might
tend to undermine public confidence in the court-martial system. It
should be noted, however, that as a matter of experience the expressed
concern has been for possible prejudice to the accused rather than the
jeopardy to the public confidence.
A mistrial must be granted whenever it appears to the law officer that
some circumstance arising during the proceedings casts substantial doubt
upon the fairness of the trial. While no court has attempted to make a
definite list of occasions requiring or justifying a mistrial, an examination
of all the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals will acquaint us
with the law's current status.
On seven occasions the court of Military Appeals has held that a law
officer abused his discretion in denying a motion for a mistrial. In each
case the prejudicial statement or evidence had been stricken, and in all
but one the law officer had admonished the court-martial to disregard
the objectionable matter. In each case the appellate court found the
error prejudicial-that men could not reasonably be expected to remain
46. 7 U.S.C.M.A. 46,21 C.M.R. 172 (1956).
47. 21 C.M.R. at 177.
48. 5 U.S.C.M.A. 122, 17 C.M.R. 122 (1954).
49. 17 C.M.R. at 133.
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uninfluenced in spite of the law officer's admonition. On the other hand,
in twelve cases the Court of Military Appeals found that the denial of a
motion for mistrial did not constitute an abuse of the law officer's dis-
cretion. In three other cases, the court found that to grant a motion
for mistrial was a proper exercise of judicial discretion.
Each case clearly has been determined on its own facts. Errors of the
same general character may or may not require mistrial, depending on
the particular context in which they occur.
What constitutes an abuse of discretion and what decisions lie within
the purview of the law officer's judicial discretion has not been, and
probably cannot be, generally articulated in meaningful terms.
Inadmissible -Evidence of Pre-Trial Confession or Admission. Three
cases involved testimony concerning pre-trial confessions or admissions
made by an accused who had not been admonished according to the re-
quirements of Article 31. In each case the Court of Military Appeals
found an abuse of discretion in the denial of a mistrial. From this we
might conclude that the introduction of evidence of an inadmissible
confession amounts to incurable prejudice, leaving no discretion in the
law officer. However, in each case special circumstances appear. In
both United States v. Harris" and United States v. Diterlizzi5l it was
noted that the prejudicial admission concerned the only issue in the case,
that other evidence on the issue was meager or inconclusive, and that
members of the court-martial exhibited a reluctance to accept the
ruling of the law officer excluding the statement. In United States v.
Grant 2 the court expressly rejected the idea that compelling evidence
has any effect when a confession is introduced without showing com-
pliance with the Code. However, the error in Grant was compounded
by the improper testimony of a senior officer, occupying a command
relationship to members of the court, to the effect that the accused was
a despicable character, unworthy of belief by the court-martial.
A fourth case, United States v. Justice,3 involved a pre-trial admis-
sion but is not particularly helpful in the consideration of the problem.
In Justice the law officer reversed an earlier ruling and excluded a pre-
trial statement that had been earlier admitted. He denied the accused's
motion for mistrial, and instructed the court to disregard the statement.
In examining the record, the Court of Military Appeals first expressed
50. 8 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 24 C.M.R. 9 (1957).
51. 8 U.S.C.M.A. 334, 24 C.M.R. 144 (1957).
52. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 585, 28 C.M.R. 151 (1959).
53. 13 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 32 C.M.R. 31 (1962).
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the view that the statements were erroneously excluded. But, the court
continues, assuming the evidence to have been inadmissible, the problem
is one of "assessing the probable impact of the excluded evidence upon
the court-martial." In the instant case, the majority of the court thought
that the statement added nothing to the case established by other
evidence-that it was an "unimportant crypticism." Hence, the direct
and specific instruction to disregard was sufficient. If the language of
Justice is taken at face value, it casts doubt on the idea of general pre-
judice advanced in Grant. The concern is for specific prejudice. How-
ever, the facts of Justice deprive the opinion of its virility. The ex-
cluded pre-trial statement was not only inocuous, but it was legally ad-
missible and excluded through error. The decision does not appear to
be relevant to the status of the inadmissible confession or admission
that is erroneously brought to the court's attention.
On the basis of these cases we can conclude that the admission of
evidence of a pre-trial admission or confession obtained without com-
pliance with Article 31 probably requires a mistrial. However, the
existence of aggravating circumstances strengthens the movant's posi-
tion.
Disclosure of Prior Conviction. In two cases prejudice caused by
prior convictions has been held to be sufficiently overcome by appro-
priate instructions. In a thid, United States v. Keleher,54 evidence of
prior conviction was admitted on the merits during the cross-examination
of the accused. Later the evidence was withdrawn. The law officer's
action in denying a mistrial was sustained on appeal. Apparently the
court was impressed by the fact that the evidence was admissible for
impeachment purposes and all members of the court indicated their
willingness in their ability to disregard the evidence.
In an earlier case, United States v. Shamlian, 5 the trial counsel in-
formed the court of the fact of the accused's prior convictions and his
adverse attitude toward service. The court held the law officer's ad-
monition adequate to cure the prejudice. On the other hand, in United
States v. Richard,5 6 it was held an abuse of discretion to deny a mistrial
after an officer called for service and the court-martial disclosed a
knowledge of prior offenses in the presence of court members. The
apparent reasons for the distinction are: (1) Richard involved a charge
54. 14 US.C.M.A. 125, 33 C.M.R. 337 (1963).
55. 9 US.C.M.A. 28, 25 C.M.R. 290 (1958).
56. 7 U.S.C.M.A. 46,21 C.M.R. 172 (1956).
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of felony grade-rape-while the crime in Shamlian was of a lesser
nature-drunk on post; (2) the prior crimes in Richard were identified
as being of the same nature as the one being tried, while in Shamlian the
trial counsel's reference to previous convictions was general; (3) the
disclosure in Richard was compounded by reference to a psychiatric
examination and a polygraph test; (4) at least one member of the
Richard court indicated an adverse reaction to the disclosure; (5) the
evidence in Richard was less than compelling; and (6) no admonition to
disregard the statement was given in Richard.
Generalizing, we conclude that disclosure of prior crimes or con-
victions does not per se require a mistrial. However, when the disclosure
is compounded with other aggravating circumstances, the admonition to
the court may not be sufficient.
Inflanmatory Statements by or to Court Members. In Richard,57 an
officer called for service on the court-martial stated that he should be
excused because he had served on another court-martial trying the ac-
cused for a similar crime, he knew of a pending investigation for still
another similar crime, he knew of a psychiatric examination of the
accused, and he knew of a polygraph test. In United States v. Batche-
for,58 a Congressional Medal of Honor holder called for service on a
court-martial trying the accused for offenses involving disloyalty, stated
that he had "formulated and expressed the opinion that the accused
is a traitor." Both statements were made in the presence of the court.
Both officers were, of course, forthwith excused. In Richard a mistrial
was required but in Batchelor it was not an abuse of discretion to deny
the mistrial. However, the distinction between the two cases is plain
and rational. In Richard the prejudicial statements referred to matters
of fact while in Batchelor the statement was one of opinion only. Its
validity was not supported by reference to evidentiary matters.
In the Grant59 case a senior officer witness, the commanding officer
of the garrison at which the court met, testified that the accused had "the
habit of writing rubber checks" and was a "psychopathic liar." While
it was here held an abuse of discretion to deny a mistrial, it must be noted
that the testimony of the witness also alluded to an inadmissible pre-trial
confession. It cannot be said that the derogatory statements alone would
have required a mistrial. On the other hand, the Court of Military Ap-
57. Id.
58. 7 U.S.C.M.A. 354,22 C.M.R. 144 (1956).
59. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 585,28 C.M.R. 151 (1959).
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peals said "it is difficult to see how the members could erase from their
minds the damning effects of [the] vituperative declarations and accord
to the accused the fair trial to which he is entitled."
The president of the court-martial in United States v. Lynch"0 spoke
frequently to other court members and in open court in an intemperate
fashion about his own honor and that of the military service. It was
held an abuse of discretion to deny a mistrial. The statements of the
president demonstrated his lack of judiciousness and deprived the court
of its capacity as a judicial tribunal.
These cases appear to support the general proposition that it may be
an abuse of discretion to deny a defense motion for mistrial when the
accused has been improperly and grieviously injured by statements by or
to court members. It is relevant whether the statement purported to
be one of fact or one of opinion only, whether the declarant occupied
a senior command relationship to any member of the court, or whether
the witness is in a position otherwise to unduly influence members of the
court.
Evidence of Lie Detection Test. One of the circumstances requiring
a mistrial in Richard6' was the officer's statement that he had knowledge
of a certain polygraph test. The context of the statement supported the
inference that the test had been taken by the accused. The Court of
Military Appeals thought this a circumstance that irreparably prejudiced
the court. On the other hand, in United States v. Wolf,62 a witness
testified that he, the witness, had taken a lie detector test. The testimony
was stricken and no mistrial was required. The two cases have little
similarity; hence, the different results cause no problem.
Generally, it can be said that evidence that the accused was subjected
to a lie detector test, with no disclosure as to the results, is highly pre-
judicial to the accused and may require a mistrial particularly when
other prejudicial disclosures have been made.
Bias Toward Witness. In United States v. Waldron,63 several mem-
bers of the court had served on another court-martial, trying another
accused, in which testimony had been heard concerning activities of one
Kang Tae Hyong who was called as a witness in the present case.
Finding that the earlier contact with the witness might have produced
some prejudgment as to his credibility, the law officer declared a mis-
60. 9 U.S.C.M.A. 523, 26 C.M.R. 303 (1958).
61. 9 U.S.C.M.A. 28, 25 C.M.R. 290 (1958).
62. 9 U.S.C.M.A. 137, 25 C.M.R. 399 (1958).
63. 15 US.C.M.A. 628, 36 C.M.R. 126 (1966).
19671 -
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
trial over the objection of the accused. The Court of Military Appeals
affirmed, recognizing that while ordinarily bias that will justify a mis-
trial is in favor of or against a party to the cause, prejudgment of an im-
portant witness by the triers of fact is just as discrediting to the fairness
of the trial and as obstructive to the ends of justice as pre-existing bias
for or against a party; and evidence as to such pre-judgment of an im-
portant witness may justify a mistrial. Yet, when a similar question was
raised in United States v. Simonds," a different result was reached.
There, two members of the court had seen a document charging Moore,
a prosecution witness, with an offense similar to the one for which the
accused was being tried. While the defense did not request a mistrial
and indeed tried on argument to turn suspicion for the instant offense on
Moore, it was urged on appeal that a mistrial should have been granted.
In this instance no mistrial was required, the appellate court suggesting
that the test is whether the court members have acquired so fixed an
opinion of the witness' credibility as to make it likely they would judge
his truthfulness on the basis of this pre-existing opinion rather than on
evidence.
Generally Inadmissible Evidence. Ordinarily an error in admitting
evidence can be cured by striking it and instructing the court members
to disregard it. Only in the extraordinary situation, where the improperly
admitted testimony is inflammatory or highly prejudicial to the extent
that it cannot be erased reasonably from the mind of an ordinary person,
is there an occasion for the law officer to grant a motion for mistrial.
Thus, in Patrick65 an isolated hearsay statement identifying the accused
as one who was reputedly accepting money for making false entries in
service records did not require a mistrial. In United States v. Hurt 6 the
accused, on trial for a capital crime, was identified by a child witness
as the person who had abducted the victim. The child was impeached
and his testimony stricken. No member of the court indicated doubt as
to his ability to disregard the testimony. It was not an abuse of discre-
tion to deny a mistrial. A similar result was reached in United States v.
Wimberly67 where the court had seen exhibits that were later excluded.
Withdrawn Plea of Guilty. In United States v. Walter" the accused,
charged with larceny, entered a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The
64. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 641, 36 C.M.R. 139 (1966).
65. 8 U.S.C.M.A. 212, 24 C.M.R. 22 (1957).
66. 9 U.S.C.M.A. 735, 27 C.M.R. 3 (1958).
67. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 661, 36 C.M.R. 159 (1966).
68. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 142, 33 C.M.R. 354 (1963).
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law officer, finding the plea to have been improvidently made, granted
a motion to change the plea to not guilty. There was no motion for
a mistrial and no admonition to the court to disregard the plea of guilty.
After conviction, the accused argued that the law officer abused his dis-
cretion in failing, sua sponte, to declare a mistrial. The omission was
found to be a proper exercise of judicial discretion and thus not review-
able. Such a duty arises only when the posture of the case casts substantial
doubt on the fairness of the trial. In Walter the strength of the govern-
ment's case and the paucity of the accused's evidence forestalled such
doubt.
Other Possible Grounds for Mistrial. The most common grounds for
mistrial in civilian courts is the failure of the jury to agree upon a verdict.
This ground does not occur often in the court-martial as the requirement
of unanimity is present only in capital cases; and, more particularly, in
view of the Manual's provision that a finding of not guilty results if no
other valid finding is reached.69 Notwithstanding their improbability,
"hung juries," do occur in courts-martial.70 While a two-thirds vote is
required to convict, reballoting can be required by a simple majority.
Thus, where a majority of the court, but less than two-thirds, votes for
conviction the court-martial fails to convict. However, if reconsideration
is requested and those who voted to convict vote for a reballot, a new
vote is required. Assuming that no one changes his mind the vote again
fails to convict, and a further reconsideration may be required by the
majority. This process may continue indefinitely and the court thus
becomes effectively deadlocked.71 Also, a deadlock may arise in regard
to the sentence. Findings of guilt and the sentence to be imposed are
voted upon separately. Two-thirds of the court may concur in the
finding of guilt, but it may be impossible to obtain the agreement of
tnvo-thirds upon the sentence. In this case a re-hearing is required on
the sentence. 72 Also, in civil courts, a common cause for mistrial is the
illness or other disability of a juror after the trial has commenced. This
fortuity is avoided in military trials by the provision of the Manual
relating to absence and replacement of members." In the infrequent
cases of deadlock, it seems certain that the physical inability of the
69. M.C.M. 1951, para. 74 (d) (3).
70. For an extensive comment on this subject, see Henson, The Hung Jury: A Court
Martial Dilemma, 35 MIL. L. REv. 59 (1967).
71. See United States v. Nash, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 550, 18 C.M.R. 174 (1955).
72. United States v. Walker, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 23 C.M.R. 133 (1957).
73. M.C.M. 1951, para. 41.
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court to continue the trial within the framework of the law is sufficient
ground for mistrial, provided the inability is not caused by the prose-
cution's fault.
A recent case, United States v. Liberator,4 was based on the presence
of unauthorized persons in the closed session in which the court de-
liberated on findings. A sergeant from the base legal office had entered
the room momentarily to bring the members coffee after voting on the
findings that had taken place. The denial of the mistrial was sustained.
The facts were found to rebut any presumption of prejudice, particularly
in view of the accused's plea of guilty.
The Discretion to Grant. No Court of Military Appeals decision has
held that a law officer abused his discretion in granting a mistrial. Two
decisions have held otherwise. In United States v. Schilling75 the law
officer declared a mistrial on account of the breakdown of the record-
ing device used to make the record. The law officer was held justified
in declaring a mistrial under these circumstances. In the Johnpier76
case, the mistrial was declared because the law officer felt his position
with the court had been prejudiced by diclosures of his being "over-
ruled" on a matter of law by the convening authority. The order of
mistrial was justified.
It seems a correct generalization that notice of an error in the course
of the trial which is of such a nature as to vitiate the result justifies the
declaration of a mistrial, even in the face of an objection by the accused.
Board of Review Decisions. Several reported decisions of service
boards are relevant to our present interests and enlarge the case law of
mistrials. Boards have held that the law officer abused his discretion in
refusing to grant a mistrial when: (1) a witness who corroborated the
testimony of the chief victim in a rape prosecution became so emotionally
upset that she could not be cross-examined, the mere striking of her
testimony and admonition of the court being insufficient to remove the
prejudice7 and (2) the division commander had briefed his officers as
to command policies on sentencing, although the officers on the court-
martial said they would not be influenced thereby.78 It is not an abuse
of discretion to deny a mistrial in a case where (1) five of eight mem-
bers of the court read a newspaper account of an out of court hearing
74. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 499, 34 C.M.R. 279 (1964).
75. 9 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 22 C.M.R. 272 (1957).
76. 12 U.S.C.M.A. 90, 30 C.M.R. 90 (1961).
77. Courier, C.G.C.M. 9896, 32 C.M.R. 717 (1962).
78. Webster, A.C.M. 15734, 27 C.M.R. 956 (1960).
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and were later excused and replaced, 79 or (2) a person was stationed in
the courtroom to signal the witness when his testimony approached a
sensitive security area."'
It was no error to grant mistrials in three cases where improvident
guilty pleas were entered in open court and rejected by the law officer.8'
Also, where the law officer declared a mistrial on account of improper
remarks by the president of the court-martial, the objection of the
accused on the ground that a witness would not be available for a later
trial did not make the declaration improper.8 2 And a mistrial declared
in order to obtain a change of venue where the court has been subjected
to command influence is proper.8 3 A mistrial may properly be granted
on account of a breakdown of the recording device.8 Finally, a mistrial
was declared when the president of the court-martial indicated an un-
willingness to abide by the law officer's determination of admissibility.8
A SUGGESTED STATEMENT OF STANDARDS
It is patently impossible to reduce the law governing mistrials before
courts-martial to simple, easily stated rules to be applied routinely by
law officers. The ultimate objective-to assure fairness in military trials
-remains constant. The circumstances under which claims of unfairness
arise are never repeated. Hence, it is essential that in each instance the
discretion to order mistrials be vested in an agency of the court-martial
who can evaluate the totality of the circumstances and determine
whether the probability of a fair trial has been impaired. In the General
Court-Martial the discretion has properly been vested in the law officer.
He is a professional jurist, present in the courtroom and able to assess
the impact of alleged prejudicial matter. The cases suggest many-factors
that may, together or alone, be determinative: whether the prejudicial
matter goes to a point supported or unsupported by other evidence;
whether the members of the court-martial exhibit a willingness or reluc-
tance to heed the admonition to disregard the prejudicial circumstances;
whether the prejudicial statement was made by a senior officer, in a
position to influence members of the court; whether the prejudicial
79. Cook, A.C.M. 17411,31 C.M.R. 607 (1960).
80. Kaufman, A.C.M. 18074, 33 C.M.R. 748 (1962).
81. Burns, 23 C.M.R. 614 (1957) (C.M. 395207); Watt, 32 C.M.R. 504 (1962) (C.M.
407459); Scarbrough, 28 C.M.R. 527 (1959) (C.M. 401819).
82. Bowen, N.C.M. 56-02093, 22 C.M.R. 671 (1956).
83. Long, A.C.M. 14066, 24 C.M.R. 847 (1957).
84. Hook, A.C.M. 12847,23 C.M.R. 750 (1956).
85. Reese, N.C.M. 56-03467, 24 C.M.R. 467 (1956).
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statement purported to be a statement of fact or opinion; whether
evidence incites hostility or animosity or is degrading or character de-
stroying; and finally whether the prejudice goes to impair the judicial
character of the court or the independence of the law officer. The list
has no discernible limits and will continue to expand as more cases are
decided.
An effort to enumerate the circumstances that require or justify a
declaration of mistrial may be fruitless. At the same time, the phrase
"manifest necessity" is little more than an epithet. A more meaningful
statement of the general criteria ought to be helpful. The following,
which borrows heavily from the Model Penal Code, 6 is suggested as a
proper guide for the declaration of mistrials in courts-martial.
1. The law officer shall terminate a trial anytime before findings
when he determines:
(a) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in con-
formity with the law; or
(b) There is a legal defect in the proceedings which would make
any judgment rendered upon the findings reversible as a
matter of law; or
(c) Prejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom, makes it
impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to
either the accused or the government; or
(d) A substantial question exists as to the objectivity of the court
or its willingness to be bound by the law officer's instruc-
tions.
2. The convening authority may direct the termination of a trial by
court-martial prior to findings when required by urgent and un-
foreseen military necessity.8 1
3. A subsequent prosecution based on the same conduct, for viola-
tion of the same provision of the code is not barred when the trial
is terminated after arraignment and before findings when:
(a) The termination is for any reason mentioned in 1 and 2 above.
(b) The accused consents to the termination or waives, by motion
or otherwise, his right to object to the termination.
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(4) (P.O.D. 1962).
87. The cases do not so limit the convening authority. However, military necessity
seems the only rational basis to permit the convening authority to intrude upon a trial
in progress.
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